Arbitrum Fast Feed Proposal Would Route 97% Of Revenue To DAO Treasury

Arbitrum governance is considering a Fast Feed proposal that would create a paid, authenticated data streaming product for Arbitrum One and route most subscription revenue back to the DAO treasury. The Constitutional AIP proposes giving subscribers access to sequencer ordering details after finalization. The revenue split is one of the most interesting parts of the proposal: 97% would go to the Arbitrum DAO Treasury, while 3% would go to the Arbitrum Developer Guild.

That makes the proposal more than a technical data product. It is also a protocol revenue experiment. At a time when major Layer 2 networks are trying to prove they can generate sustainable economic value, Arbitrum’s Fast Feed proposal gives the DAO a direct way to monetize infrastructure demand.

TL;DR Arbitrum’s Fast Feed proposal would create a paid authenticated data stream for Arbitrum One. The proposed revenue split sends 97% to the Arbitrum DAO Treasury and 3% to the Arbitrum Developer Guild. The feed is ordering-neutral and does not allow transaction reordering or frontrunning.

What Fast Feed Is Designed To Do Fast Feed is aimed at users who need faster and more authenticated access to Arbitrum One data. In practice, that kind of product is likely most relevant to sophisticated market participants, infrastructure providers, and teams that care deeply about timing, ordering, and execution visibility. But the proposal is careful about the limits.

The feed is described as ordering-neutral. It does not allow subscribers to reorder transactions, manipulate sequencing, or gain direct frontrunning rights. That matters because any product connected to transaction ordering can quickly raise concerns about MEV advantages.

Arbitrum’s proposal instead frames Fast Feed as a paid data access product. That distinction is important for governance. A network can monetize infrastructure without giving users unfair control over transaction flow.

The proposal’s design will be judged partly on whether delegates belie